

Monopolistic Conduct in Electronic Commerce: A Competition Law Analysis of TikTok

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Abstract

This article analyzes monopolistic behavior in electronic commerce conducted through Electronic Systems (Perdagangan Melalui Sistem Elektronik/PMSE) on the TikTok platform, particularly through the TikTok Shop feature, from the perspective of Indonesian competition law. The purpose of this study is to examine the compatibility of TikTok's social commerce business model with Law Number 5 of 1999 on the Prohibition of Monopoly Practices and Unfair Business Competition, as well as regulations governing PMSE. The research method employed is a normative juridical legal approach, focusing on a socio-legal perspective, which relies on secondary legal materials, including statutory regulations, legal doctrine, academic literature, relevant official reports, and empirical data. The results of this study indicate that integrating social media and e-commerce functions into a single digital ecosystem creates the significant potential for monopolistic practices, including control over content-distribution algorithms, dominance over user data, market access discrimination, and predatory pricing. This condition has the potential to harm fair business competition and suppress the sustainability of micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs). This study concludes that the existing legal framework for business competition has not been fully adaptable to the characteristics of platform-based digital businesses. Therefore, it is necessary to update the regulations framework and strengthen supervision by competition authorities so that the digital commerce ecosystem operates fairly, equitably, and sustainably.

1. Introduction

The rapid growth of e-commerce platforms in recent years reflects the broader digital transformation of trade.¹ This transformation has given rise to technology-based trading models that utilize electronic systems, as recognized in Government Regulation (PP) Number 80 of 2019 concerning Trade Through Electronic Systems. Initially functioning merely as tools for communication and promotion, the internet and social media have evolved into integrated spaces for direct commercial transactions.² However, this development has also enabled the emergence of platform-based market structures in which a single digital platform acts not only as an intermediary but as a controller of the entire digital trading ecosystem.³ Through this position, digital platforms can determine the rules of interaction, regulate access to markets, and control the flow of information and transactions. This structural shift from open competition to more concentrated digital markets poses significant challenges to the principles of fair business competition, thereby necessitating a re-evaluation of existing competition law frameworks to ensure their relevance in the digital economy.⁴

The following table shows the distribution of e-commerce market share in Indonesia for the current period, highlighting the dominance of several digital platforms within the e-commerce ecosystem.

Table 1: Estimated E-commerce Market Share in Indonesia (GMV & User Access)

Platform E-commerce	Estimasi Pangsa Pasar / Akses (%)
Shopee	~36% share of GMV Indonesia
Tokopedia	~35 % share of GMV Indonesia
TikTok Shop (2022)	~5 % share of GMV Indonesia
TikTok Shop (2024)	~11 % share of GMV Indonesia
Shopee Akses Pengguna (2025)	53.22 % of internet users
TikTok Shop Akses Pengguna (2025)	27.37 % of internet users
Tokopedia Akses Pengguna (2025)	9.57 % of internet users
Lazada Akses Pengguna (2025)	9.09 % of internet users

Source: Compiled by the author based on Momentum Works (2024), Katadata (2024), dan Bisnis Indonesia (2024)

The data shows that Indonesia's e-commerce market is still dominated by major platforms such as Shopee and Tokopedia, but TikTok Shop has also experienced significant growth in recent years. This can be seen from the market share of TikTok Shop, which increased from around 5% in 2022 to about 11% of the total Gross Merchandise Value (GMV) in 2024, although it remains below Shopee and Tokopedia, which control around 36% and 35% of the market, respectively.

In this study, several key concepts are employed to frame the analysis of competition issues in platform-based electronic commerce. Digital monopoly refers to a form of market domination achieved not solely through conventional market share control, but through structural control over digital infrastructure, user access, and data flows. Algorithmic dominance describes the ability of digital platforms to determine market visibility and consumer preferences through opaque recommendation and ranking systems. Platform gatekeeping refers to the role of platforms as intermediaries that selectively control market access for enterprises. At the same time, walled garden ecosystems are closed digital environments in which users and merchants are structurally locked into a single platform's services.

The digitalization of trade through electronic systems (PMSE) has transformed not only transaction patterns but also the structure of competition within digital markets. Platform-based business models now integrate multiple functions—social interaction, content distribution, and commercial transactions—within a single

¹ Rezza Akmalia, "Pengaruh Ekonomi Digital Terhadap Pertumbuhan Dan Perkembangan Ekonomi Di Indonesia," *Universitas Islam Tribakti Lirboyo*, 2023.

² Rr. Getha Fety Dianari, "Pengaruh E-Commerce Terhadap Pertumbuhan Ekonomi Indonesia," *Bina Ekonomi* 22, no. 1 (2019), <https://doi.org/10.26593/be.v22i1.3619.45-64>.

³ Maria R.U.D. Tambunan and Rozan Anwar, "Transformasi Budaya Organisasi Otoritas Perpajakan Indonesia Menghadapi Era Ekonomi Digital," *Jurnal Aplikasi Bisnis Dan Manajemen*, ahead of print, 2019, <https://doi.org/10.17358/jabm.5.2.253>.

⁴ Eri Yanti Nasution et al., "Perkembangan Transaksi Bisnis E-Commerce Terhadap Pertumbuhan Ekonomi Di Indonesia," *Jesya* 3, no. 2 (2020), <https://doi.org/10.36778/jesya.v3i2.227>.

ecosystem, as exemplified by TikTok's social commerce model through its TikTok Shop feature.⁵ This integration enables platforms to exercise control over information flows, algorithmic product visibility, and consumer preference data, thereby creating a significant competitive advantage within a closed or “walled garden” ecosystem.⁶ While such integration may enhance efficiency and market reach, it simultaneously raises serious legal concerns regarding anti-competitive practices and unfair competition. From a juridical perspective, the hybrid nature of social commerce platforms such as TikTok Shop exposes regulatory gray areas, as existing legal frameworks—particularly Law No. 5 of 1999 on the Prohibition of Monopoly Practices and Unfair Business Competition and Law No. 8 of 1999 on Consumer Protection—have not explicitly anticipated platform dominance rooted in algorithmic control and data concentration.^{7 8 9}

The development of platform-based digital commerce is also a significant concern globally. Various jurisdictions have begun formulating specific regulations to address the dominance of large digital platforms, which could potentially hinder fair competition. The European Union, for example, introduced the Digital Markets Act (DMA), which established the category of gatekeepers for digital platforms with significant market power, and requires such platforms to adhere to principles of fairness, openness, and the prohibition of the abuse dominant positions.¹⁰ This approach suggests a shift in the paradigm in competition regulation from purely conventional market-based regulation to structural oversight of the power of digital platforms. Although Indonesia does not yet have a special regulation equivalent to the DMA, this development serves as an important reference point for assessing the urgency of renewing the national competition law framework in the digital economy era.¹¹ In Indonesia, the rapid expansion of digital commerce presents significant regulatory challenges for the Business Competition Supervisory Commission (*Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha*).^{12 13}

The gap between *das sollen* and *das sein* becomes increasingly evident in the regulation of digital platform markets. While Law Number 5 of 1999 on the Prohibition of Monopoly Practices and Unfair Business Competition, particularly Article 35, grants the Business Competition Supervisory Commission (KPPU) the authority to supervise and provide policy recommendations related to monopolistic practices, existing legal instruments remain insufficient to anticipate emerging digital business models such as social commerce platforms like TikTok Shop. In practice, MSMEs face structural barriers to market access within algorithm-driven, data-based ecosystems. At the same time, the concentration of consumer data on global digital platforms strengthens their market power. This condition raises broader concerns about data sovereignty and national control over the digital economy.¹⁴ These conditions create legal loopholes that may allow large digital platforms to dominate market access and competitive dynamics, placing smaller business enterprises at a disadvantage. Consequently, the rapid evolution of digital technology has outpaced the existing regulatory framework, leaving practices such as algorithmic control, data concentration, and platform integration in a legal gray area when assessed under

⁵ N Ariyanti and W C Nugroho, “Peran Kppu Dalam Melindungi Konsumen Dari Pelaku Usaha Tidak Sehat,” *Indonesian Journal of Law and Social-Political Governance* 3, no. 1 (2023).

⁶ Alya Anindita Maheswari, “Perlindungan Konsumen dalam Transaksi Jual Beli Melalui E-Commerce Lintas Negara,” *JURNAL EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT* 11, no. 2 (2023), <https://doi.org/10.37081/ed.v11i2.4714>.

⁷ Suparna Wijaya and Agus Juhana, “Kajian Perpu Nomor 1 Tahun 2020 Terkait Perdagangan Melalui Sistem Elektronik,” *JIAFE (Jurnal Ilmiah Akuntansi Fakultas Ekonomi)* 7, no. 2 (2021), <https://doi.org/10.34204/jiafe.v7i2.3510>.

⁸ Khairin Ulyani Tarigan and Mahmud Siregar, “Implikasi Hukum Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Terhadap Regulasi Perdagangan Internasional Di Indonesia,” *Locus Journal of Academic Literature Review* 2, no. 2 (2023).

⁹ Muh.Fathir Maulid Yusuf et al., “Dampak Penutupan Tiktok Shop Terhadap Pengguna Dan Pelaku Bisnis Dalam E-Commerce,” *Jurnal Ilmiah Ilmu Sosial Dan Pendidikan (JISDIK)* 2, no. 1 (2024).

¹⁰ Nizar Hamdun et al., “Strategi Pelaku Bisnis Electronic Commerce (E-Commerce),” *Journal Locus Penelitian Dan Pengabdian* 1, no. 2 (2022), <https://doi.org/10.36418/locus.v1i2.13>.

¹¹ Rr Lyia Aina Priyadiati, “Analisis Yuridis Klausul Disclaimer Oleh Pelaku Usaha Pada Situs Jual Beli Online (E-Commerce),” *LITERATUS* 3, no. 2 (2022), <https://doi.org/10.37010/lit.v3i2.1327>.

¹² Muhammad Bintang Priyono and Dian Permata Sari, “Dampak Aplikasi Tiktok Dan Tiktok Shop Terhadap UMKM Di Indonesia,” *Jurnal Ilmiah Wahana Pendidikan* 9, no. September (2023).

¹³ Mafulla Dian Hadiano Nuh Krama, Hestianah Sudiah, “Dampak Penutupan Tik Tok Shop Dalam Konsep Komunikasi Interpersonal,” *Jurnal Manajemen* 2, no. 2 (2022).

¹⁴ Widadatul Ulya, “Perlindungan Hukum bagi Pelaku Usaha pada Transaksi Bisnis Social Commerce Tiktok Shop (Perspektif Hukum Positif dan Hukum Islam),” *Journal of Indonesian Comparative of Syari’ah Law* 6, no. 1 (2023), <https://doi.org/10.21111/jicli.v6i1.9746>.

conventional competition law principles. Addressing this regulatory gap is essential to ensure that Indonesia's digital economy develops within a framework of fair and sustainable competition.¹⁵

These conditions suggest that the legal challenge of competition law in the PMSE lies not only in the substance of Law Number 5 of 1999 on the Prohibition of Monopoly Practices and Unfair Business Competition, but also in the absence of derivative legal instruments that specifically regulate the behavior of digital platforms. Without clear technical guidelines for algorithmic assessment, data control, and cross-service integration, competition regulation risks lagging behind technological innovation. Therefore, normative studies that situate PMSE practices within the framework of the authority of the KPPU are essential as a basis for developing more responsive and context-specific legal policies.¹⁶ The main characteristics of platform-based PMSEs platforms include significant information asymmetry between platform providers and users, including business enterprises. Digital platforms have full access to and control over data, as well as the algorithms that determine product visibility, consumer preferences, and transaction patterns. In contrast, enterprises do not have a balanced bargaining position. This asymmetry has the potential to create structural dependencies that can indirectly affect competition dynamics without requiring conventional monopolistic practices. Based on this background, the author formulates the research questions: 1) How are monopolistic practices defined and regulated under Law Number 5 of 1999 on the Prohibition of Monopoly Practices and Unfair Business Competition? 2) How is electronic commerce conducted through PMSE on the TikTok platform implemented in practice? 3) How can the alleged monopolistic practices in PMSE-based trading through TikTok be analyzed from the perspective of Indonesian competition law?

These developments require an adjustment to the legal paradigm of competition law, especially in understanding the role and authority of competition supervisory institutions in the digital era. The authority of the KPPU authority is not only tested in law enforcement against existing violations, but also in preventing potential distortions of competition stemming from system design and digital platform policies. Therefore, legal studies that emphasize the analysis of the institutional authority of the KPPU institutional authority in addressing PMSE practices are crucial for filling gaps in normative studies and for advancing competition law that is adaptable to the digital economy.

Existing studies on TikTok Shop and social commerce generally focus on three main themes: the economic impact on MSMEs, pricing strategies within e-commerce platforms, and consumer protection in digital transactions. However, these studies remain fragmented. Research by Isal and Sidik (2023) highlights the structural dependence of MSMEs on social commerce platforms.¹⁷ Whereas Kurniasari and Rahman (2023) discuss the abuse of dominant position in digital marketplaces.¹⁸ Meanwhile, studies on predatory pricing in e-commerce (Fitri & Lesmana, 2021; Jayani et al., 2022) emphasize pricing strategies but do not address algorithmic market control.¹⁹ Consequently, there remains a lack of research that integrates platform governance, algorithmic dominance, and competition law analysis within the framework of PMSE regulation in Indonesia. Next, Ulya (2023) in the study "*Perlindungan Hukum bagi Pelaku Usaha pada Transaksi Bisnis Social Commerce TikTok Shop (Perspektif Hukum Positif dan Hukum Islam)*" examines TikTok from the perspective of legal protection and transaction fairness.²⁰ This study highlights the importance of legal certainty and business ethics in social commerce practices. However, the study's focus remains limited to the relationship between data and the protection of enterprises, without directly relating it to the legal regime of competition law, monopoly analysis, or dominant position under Law Number 5 of 1999 on the Prohibition of Monopoly Practices and Unfair Business Competition.

¹⁵ Novalia Pertiwi and Annisa Azzahrah Burhan, "Efektifitas Penerapan Program Kepatuhan Persaingan Usaha Dalam Pencegahan Persaingan Usaha Tidak Sehat," *Jurnal Studia Legalia* 4, no. 01 (2023), <https://doi.org/10.61084/jsl.v4i01.66>.

¹⁶ Firlli Wijaksana and Rosalinda Elsina, "Implikasi Yuridis Strategi Flash Sale Oleh Pelaku Usaha E-Commerce," *Bureaucracy Journal : Indonesia Journal of Law and Social-Political Governance* 3, no. 1 (2023).

¹⁷ Muhammad Aryanang Isal and Rahmat Maulana Sidik, "Jeratan Social Commerce: Matinya Masa Depan UMKM Di Indonesia Studi Kasus TikTok Shop Di Indonesia," *Commerce Law* 3, no. 2 (2023), <https://doi.org/10.29303/commercelaw.v3i2.3551>.

¹⁸ Tri Widya Kurniasari Kurniasari and Arif Rahman, "Perlindungan Hukum bagi Pelaku Usaha UMKM Terhadap Penyalahgunaan Posisi Dominan Platform Digital : Marketplace Melalui Penetapan Harga dan Penguasaan Pasar," *REUSAM: Jurnal Ilmu Hukum* 10, no. 2 (2023), <https://doi.org/10.29103/reusam.v10i2.9577>.

¹⁹ Adis Nur Hayati, "Analisis Tantangan Dan Penegakan Hukum Persaingan Usaha Pada Sektor E-Commerce Di Indonesia," *Jurnal Penelitian Hukum De Jure* 21, no. 1 (2021), <https://doi.org/10.30641/dejure.2021.v21.109-122>.

²⁰ Ulya, "Perlindungan Hukum bagi Pelaku Usaha pada Transaksi Bisnis Social Commerce Tiktok Shop (Perspektif Hukum Positif dan Hukum Islam)."

Based on the existing literature, it can be concluded that most studies remain fragmented across the economic impact of MSMEs, pricing strategies, and legal protection. There has been no research that comprehensively analyses TikTok Shop as a social commerce PMSE platform by placing control over algorithms, user data, cross-service integration of Law Number 5 of 1999 on the Prohibition of Monopoly Practices and Unfair Business Competition and the authority of KPPU institutions. Therefore, this research's novelty lies in the juridical approach to studying TikTok Shop as a PMSE platform operating within a closed-platform (*walled garden*) ecosystem, as well as in evaluating the adequacy of Indonesian competition law and the role of KPPU in dealing with the non-conventional forms of digital monopoly, which are primarily based on data concentration and algorithmic control. This research is expected to fill a gap in normative studies while also contributing conceptually to the development of more adaptive competition law frameworks in the digital economy era.

To provide a systematic and comprehensive analysis, this article is divided into several main sections. The first section describes the conceptual and juridical framework of trade through PMSE as well as the basic principles of competition law in Indonesia, including the prohibition of monopoly practices and the abuse of dominant positions under Law Number 5 of 1999 on the Prohibition of Monopoly Practices and Unfair Business Competition. The second section discusses the characteristics of TikTok Shop's business model as a social commerce platform, with emphasis on the integration of social media and e-commerce, algorithmic control, and user data management, which could create market dominance. Furthermore, the third section analyzes practices indicative of monopoly practices and unfair competition in the TikTok Shop ecosystem, including price strategies, market access controls, and impacts on other enterprises, especially MSMEs. The fourth section examines the role, authority, and challenges of the KPPU in handling monopoly practices on digital-based PMSE platforms. It assesses the adequacy of existing legal instruments in addressing data-based monopolies and algorithmic control. The discussion concludes with a summary of the research findings and recommendations for strengthening policy and law enforcement in competition law enforcement in the digital economy.

2. Method

This research employs a normative juridical method with a statutory and conceptual approach to examine monopolistic conduct in platform-based electronic commerce (PMSE), focusing on TikTok Shop as a case study. Beyond identifying relevant legal materials, this study develops an analytical framework to assess how monopoly indicators manifest within digital platform ecosystems. The analysis operationalizes key competition law concepts—such as monopoly practices, abuse of dominant positions, and barriers to entry—by translating them into measurable legal variables relevant to digital platforms, including algorithmic control, data dominance, and platform integration.²¹ Algorithmic control is treated as a legal variable insofar as it determines product visibility, consumer access, and competitive neutrality within the platform. At the same time, data dominance is assessed as a source of market power that enables platforms to predict consumer behavior and reinforce structural dependence among enterprises. Platform integration, particularly the combination of social media functions and e-commerce services within a single ecosystem, is analyzed to evaluate whether such integration creates exclusionary effects or unfair competitive advantages under the principles of competition law. The analytical process follows a structured sequence: first, identifying relevant PMSE practices implemented by TikTok Shop; second, mapping these practices against the legal elements of monopoly practices and unfair competition as regulated under Law No. 5 of 1999; and third, conducting a normative assessment to determine whether such practices fulfill the legal criteria of anti-competitive conduct. Through this framework, legal norms are not merely described but are operationalized as evaluative tools to assess the compatibility of platform-based business models with Indonesian competition law.²²

3. Findings and Discussion

²¹ Wiwik Sri Widiarty, *Buku Ajar Metode Penelitian Hukum*, in *RISTANSI: Riset Akuntansi* (2019).

²² Rudi Salam Tarigan et al., "Pengembangan Metode Penelitian Hukum Di Indonesia," *Jurnal Intelek Insan Cendekia* 2, no. 1 (2025).

3.1 Monopoly practices according to Law Number 5 of 1999 on Prohibition of Monopoly Practices and Unfair Business Competition

The rapid development of digital technology has fundamentally transformed trade practices, particularly through the expansion of electronic commerce conducted via Electronic Systems (PMSE). This transformation has not only altered traditional transaction patterns but has also introduced new business models, including the integration of social media and e-commerce, known as social commerce.²³ In Indonesia, this development is reflected in the significant growth of e-commerce transactions, which reached IDR 476.3 trillion in 2022, demonstrating the increasing centrality of digital platforms in the national economy.²⁴ Within this ecosystem, TikTok Shop has emerged as a prominent actor by combining content distribution and commercial transactions on a single platform. With approximately 125 million monthly active users in Indonesia as of January 2024 and a social commerce transaction value of around USD 2.5 billion in 2023, TikTok possesses extensive access to consumer behavior data and digital interaction patterns.²⁵ This structural position enables the platform not only to facilitate transactions but also to influence product visibility, consumer preferences, and market access through algorithmic mechanisms, thereby generating significant data-driven market power within Indonesia's digital trade ecosystem.^{26 27}

From the perspective of Law Number 5 of 1999 on the Prohibition of Monopoly Practices and Unfair Business Competition, TikTok Shop's dominance poses several risks reminiscent of monopoly practices. First, there are indications of a significant market share, both in terms of users and transaction volume. Second, there are barriers to market entry that are not only conventional, such as capital or technology, but also in the form of control over consumer algorithms and data.²⁸ For local MSMEs that cannot effectively utilize digital technology, this kind of barrier constitutes a significant obstacle to competing on an equal footing. Bank Indonesia's 2023 report stated that around 57% of digital MSMEs in Indonesia experienced a decrease in turnover due to price competition with cheap imported products sold through social commerce platforms, such as TikTok Shop. Furthermore, the Indonesian E-commerce Association (idEA) recorded a 20-30% decrease in local MSME transactions across several sectors, especially fashion and cosmetics, as a direct result of the proliferation of social commerce.²⁹

In addition to market share and entry barriers, the price issue is crucial. TikTok Shop often offers products at remarkably low prices, even below the cost of production, which is economically feasible for local MSMEs. This strategy raises concerns about predatory pricing, specifically the practice of selling goods below cost to eliminate competitors and subsequently dominate the market. Under Article 20 of Law Number 5 of 1999 on the Prohibition of Monopoly Practices and Unfair Business Competition, this type of action falls within the prohibition category because it has the potential to eliminate competing enterprises unable to compete profitably in the long run. However, data control is equally essential. TikTok has extensive data on user behavior, encompassing viewing patterns, interests, interactions, and shopping habits. This data then serves as the basis for regulating marketing strategies and highly personalized product recommendations. Control over consumer data gives TikTok a decisive advantage over its competitors. From a legal perspective, this exclusive control over data has the potential to create a data-driven form of market dominance, which, although not explicitly prohibited by Law Number 5 of 1999 on the Prohibition of Monopoly Practices and Unfair Business Competition, poses a new challenge for enforcing competition law in the digital age.³⁰

²³ Muhammad Alfarizi and Zela Zalika, "Isu Persaingan Industri Pelayanan Kesehatan Indonesia: Tantangan Dan 'Perisai' Pengawasan KPPU," *Jurnal Persaingan Usaha* 3, no. 1 (2023), <https://doi.org/10.55869/kppu.v3i1.89>.

²⁴ Isal and Sidik, "Jeratan Social Commerce: Matinya Masa Depan UMKM Di Indonesia Studi Kasus TikTok Shop Di Indonesia."

²⁵ Adis Nur Hayati, "Analisis Tantangan Dan Penegakan Hukum Persaingan Usaha Pada Sektor E-Commerce Di Indonesia," *Jurnal Penelitian Hukum De Jure* 21, no. 1 (2021), <https://doi.org/10.30641/dejure.2021.v21.109-122>.

²⁶ Shohib Muslim et al., "Implikasi Hukum Penutupan TikTok Shop Terhadap Regulasi Hukum Bisnis Di Indonesia," *Jurnal Hukum Dan HAM Wara Sains* 2, no. 10 (2023), <https://doi.org/10.58812/jhws.v2i10.713>.

²⁷ A K Bih et al., "... of Mouth Dan Flash Sale Terhadap Pembelian Impulsif Pada Social Commerce Tiktok Shop (Studi Kasus Pada Mahasiswa Pengguna Tiktok Shop Di Kota Malang)," *E-JRM: Elektronik Jurnal Riset ...*, 2023.

²⁸ Faruq Abdul Majid et al., "Peran E-Commerce Dalam Perekonomian Indonesia Di Masa Depan.," *Jurnal Ekonomi Manajemen* 17, no. 2 (2022).

²⁹ Thalia M A Lengkong et al., "Aspek Hukum Persaingan Usaha Pada Pengelolaan Bisnis Berdasarkan Uu No. 5 Tahun 1999 Tentang Praktek Monopoli Dan Persaingan Usaha Tidak Sehat.," *Lex Privatum IX*, no. 4 (2021).

³⁰ Fitri Fitri and Sri Jaya Lesmana, "Indikasi Predatory Pricing pada Praktek Flash Sale Pelaku Usaha E-Commerce Dalam Perspektif Hukum Persaingan Usaha," *SUPREMASI HUKUM* 17, no. 02 (2021), <https://doi.org/10.33592/jsh.v17i2.1365>.

Das Sollen, as stated in Law Number 5 of 1999 on the Prohibition of Monopoly Practices and Unfair Business Competition, prohibits enterprises from dominating the market to hinder fair competition. However, das Sein demonstrates that social commerce practices, such as those used by TikTok Shop, can achieve market dominance that is difficult to attain through conventional regulatory frameworks. KPPU itself acknowledges that overcoming this digital domination poses challenges, as existing legal instruments are not fully equipped to anticipate modern business models, such as social commerce. Until now, the KPPU has been conducting market research (*market studies*) on the behavior of social commerce platforms, including TikTok Shop.³¹ In several public statements in 2024, the KPPU emphasized that social commerce poses a potential risk of monopoly; however, addressing this risk requires a more modern analytical methodology, including algorithm-based analysis and digital data. The government, through the Ministry of Trade, is also formulating revisions to electronic commerce regulations to tighten the boundaries between social media and e-commerce platforms, aiming to prevent market dominance by foreign digital entities that could harm local enterprises.

3.2 Trade Practices Using Electronic Systems (PMSE) Through TikTok Platform

The phenomenon of Trade through Electronic Systems (PMSE) in Indonesia has grown rapidly alongside the shift in consumer behavior toward digital platforms and the emergence of social commerce, which integrates social media with online trade. One prominent example is TikTok Shop, which allows merchants to sell products directly through live streaming or short videos, supported by features such as Add to Cart that enable instant purchases without leaving the application.³² This model effectively stimulates impulse buying through engaging visual content and real-time user interaction. According to Bloomberg data in 2023, the transaction value of TikTok Shop in Indonesia reached USD 2.5 billion (approximately IDR 38.5 trillion), a significant figure for a platform that has relatively recently entered the e-commerce sector. However, this integration also raises regulatory concerns because Minister of Trade Regulation No. 31 of 2023 separates social media functions from e-commerce activities to prevent platform dominance and potential unfair competition in the digital market.³³

The facts on the ground indicate that TikTok Shop is widely used by traders, including international sellers, to sell products directly to the Indonesian market. The TikTok-enabled cross-border commerce business model enables foreign sellers to enter the domestic market more easily, without the need to establish a physical presence, such as a representative office.³⁴ According to data from the Indonesian E-commerce Association (idEA), approximately 30-40% of products sold on TikTok Shop are imported, and many are sold at remarkably low prices, even below domestic market prices. This situation triggers anxiety among MSMEs across sectors such as fashion, cosmetics, and household accessories, as it is challenging to compete on price and distribution speed.

Additionally, TikTok's algorithmic model creates new challenges for PMSE regulation. TikTok has complete control over the algorithm that determines which products are displayed to consumers. Products that go viral or are promoted by celebrities (*influencers*) receive significantly higher exposure than products from small merchants who lack the capacity to conduct large-scale promotion. This practice raises the potential for discriminatory treatment that contradicts the principle of fair competition, as regulated in Law Number 5 of 1999 on the Prohibition of Monopoly Practices and Unfair Business Competition. It also creates a significant gap between large businesses and MSMEs.³⁵

Empirical observation suggests a gap between legal norms and reality. Although regulations strictly prohibit the integration of social media and e-commerce functions into a single ecosystem, TikTok Shop continues to operate in a legal gray area in practice. The government has indeed announced a temporary policy to suspend

³¹ Vicky Darmawan Prahmana and Ditha Wiradiputra, "Predatory Pricing dalam E-Commerce Menurut Perspektif Hukum Persaingan Usaha," *JISIP (Jurnal Ilmu Sosial Dan Pendidikan)* 6, no. 3 (2022), <https://doi.org/10.58258/jisip.v6i3.3277>.

³² Suwinto Johan, "Implikasi Yuridis Post Merger Notification oleh Pelaku Usaha di Indonesia," *Dialogia Iuridica: Jurnal Hukum Bisnis Dan Investasi* 12, no. 1 (2020), <https://doi.org/10.28932/di.v12i1.2441>.

³³ Rahmat, "Tinjauan Hukum Terhadap Praktek Penguasaan Pasar," *Jurnal Hukum Non Diskriminatif (JHND)* 1, no. 1 (2022), <https://doi.org/10.56854/jhnd.v1i1.42>.

³⁴ Arina Novizas and Andri Gunawan, "Studi Kasus Analisa Ekonomi atas Hukum Tentang Hukum Anti Monopoli dan Persaingan Usaha," *Jurnal Magister Ilmu Hukum* 2, no. 1 (2021), <https://doi.org/10.36722/jmih.v2i1.739>.

³⁵ Komang Kory Jayani et al., "Flash Sale Sebagai Indikasi Predatory Pricing Pada Aplikasi E-Commerce Perspektif Hukum Persaingan Usaha," *Jurnal Preferensi Hukum* 3, no. 1 (2022), <https://doi.org/10.22225/jph.3.1.4622.42-47>.

TikTok Shop activities by the end of 2023.³⁶ However, media reports and field observations indicate that many merchants and consumers continue to conduct transactions through live streaming features and external links that direct them to other platforms or facilitate direct transactions via private chat. In fact, some traders admit that they still get orders through TikTok even though the platform is officially restricted. This phenomenon demonstrates that TikTok Shop, as a business model, does not cease to exist; instead, it adapts to regulatory loopholes. This reflects the weakness of legal enforcement in Indonesia and highlights how rapidly technological innovation outpaces regulatory capabilities in anticipating new business models.³⁷

Furthermore, this condition poses a risk to local MSMEs that lack the resources to use digital technology effectively. Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) are pressured by unfair price competition and the domination of viral content exposure controlled by large merchants or foreign sellers. As reflected in the Bank Indonesia report in 2023, this reality demonstrates that PMSE through TikTok Shop has far-reaching consequences that extend beyond technological innovation, as it impacts the sustainability of small economic actors and the balance of the national market structure.³⁸ In the context of competition law, KPPU has, until mid-2024, been conducting an in-depth market study of social commerce, including TikTok Shop, to determine whether the platform's business practices violate the principles of fair competition, such as indications of predatory pricing, discrimination, or abuse of dominant positions. KPPU emphasized that digital platforms operating as closed ecosystems (*walled gardens*) pose a high risk of creating unfair digital market dominance, requiring a more modern, technology-based legal approach rather than relying solely on classical parameters such as market share.³⁹

Thus, the practice of trading through PMSE on TikTok cannot be viewed solely as a technological phenomenon or business trend; it has become a complex legal and public policy issue. TikTok Shop's business model, although it introduces innovation and efficiency in digital commerce, poses serious challenges to the principles of justice, fair competition, and the sustainability of national MSMEs.⁴⁰ More adaptive legal, regulatory, and policy adjustments are required to ensure that digital technology development does not become a loophole for business practices that can harm the public interest and local enterprises.

The phenomenon of social commerce through TikTok Shop can also be examined through the concept of platform neutrality, which requires digital platforms that function as intermediaries to maintain fair and non-discriminatory treatment toward all enterprises operating within the ecosystem. In theory, a platform that simultaneously acts as both an intermediary and a market participant risks creating structural conflicts of interest, particularly when it controls the algorithm that determines product visibility, recommendation systems, and consumer access. In the case of TikTok, the platform does not merely provide a neutral marketplace but also possesses the ability to prioritize certain products, sellers, or promotional content through algorithmic curation integrated with entertainment content. Such control could place TikTok in a platform gatekeeper position, enabling it to influence market outcomes by directing traffic and consumer attention to selected merchants or products. From a competition law perspective, this situation raises concerns regarding discriminatory treatment and unfair competitive advantages that may undermine equal market access for other sellers, particularly MSMEs that rely heavily on platform visibility to reach consumers. Therefore, incorporating the principle of platform neutrality into Indonesia's digital competition policy framework becomes essential, particularly by requiring transparency in algorithmic ranking systems and ensuring that dominant digital platforms do not exploit their intermediary position to distort competition within the electronic commerce ecosystem.

³⁶ Ayup Suran Ningsih, "Implikasi Undang-Undang Nomor 5 Tahun 1999 Tentang Larangan Praktek Monopoli Dan Persaingan Usaha Tidak Sehat Pada Pelaku Usaha Mikro Kecil Dan Menengah (UMKM)," *Jurnal Penelitian Hukum De Jure* 19, no. 2 (2019), <https://doi.org/10.30641/dejure.2019.v19.207-215>.

³⁷ Ayup Suran Ningsih, "Business Competition Supervisory Institution: A Comparison between Indonesia and Thailand," *Jurnal Hukum Novelty* 13, no. 2 (2022), <https://doi.org/10.26555/novelty.v13i2.a20631>.

³⁸ Sopyan Hadi et al., "Perlindungan Hukum Usaha Mikro Kecil Dan Menengah (UMKM) Terhadap Praktik Monopoli Dilihat Dari Perspektif Hukum Persaingan Usaha," *Commerce Law* 2, no. 1 (2022), <https://doi.org/10.29303/commercelaw.v2i1.1345>.

³⁹ Aminatuz Zahroh, "Instrumen Pasar Modal," *Iqtishoduna Jurnal Ekonomi Islam* 5, no. 1 (2016).

⁴⁰ I Nyoman Sujana, "Pasar Modal Yang Efisien," *Ekuitas: Jurnal Pendidikan Ekonomi* 5, no. 2 (2017), <https://doi.org/10.23887/ekuitas.v5i2.12753>.

3.3 Legal Analysis of the Alleged Practice of Monopoly in Commerce via Electronic System (PMSE) through TikTok

In conventional competition law analysis, monopoly practices are commonly assessed through indicators such as market share concentration, pricing behavior, and barriers to market entry. In the context of platform-based electronic commerce (PMSE), these indicators remain relevant, particularly in evaluating the dominant position of large digital platforms that integrate multiple commercial functions. Although TikTok Shop does not formally engage in direct price-setting across all transactions, its structural position as both a platform operator and market organizer enables indirect influence over pricing mechanisms and market access. High entry barriers are also evident due to the scale of capital, technology, and network effects required to compete with integrated digital platforms, thereby limiting effective competition from smaller market participants.

Beyond conventional indicators, digital platforms exhibit distinct forms of market power that are not adequately captured by traditional competition metrics. Algorithmic control over product visibility and content distribution functions as a non-price mechanism through which platforms can shape consumer choices and determine competitive outcomes. Simultaneously, the accumulation and exclusive control of consumer data enable platforms to reinforce market dominance by predicting demand patterns and optimizing commercial strategies. This data-driven, algorithm-governed environment fosters platform dependency, in which enterprises—particularly MSMEs—become structurally reliant on the platform for market access, thereby reducing their bargaining power and competitive autonomy.

The integration of social media functions, algorithmic governance, and e-commerce services within a single platform ecosystem creates a causal chain that directly contributes to market distortion. Platform integration allows operators to simultaneously control content exposure, transactional access, and consumer data flows, resulting in asymmetric information and unequal competitive conditions. This structural configuration facilitates exclusionary effects by prioritizing certain products or sellers through opaque algorithmic mechanisms, thereby distorting market competition and undermining the principle of competitive neutrality. Such conditions illustrate how the architecture of digital platforms itself, rather than explicit pricing conduct, can function as a vehicle for anticompetitive practices.

Law Number 5 of 1999 in Article 1, point 1, defines a monopoly as the centralization of economic power by one or more enterprises who control the production and/or marketing of certain goods or services, thereby causing unfair competition and harming the public interest. In addition, Article 25 paragraph (2) established a legal threshold that enterprises are considered to dominate the market if they control a minimum market share of 50% or if two or three business actors control at least 75% of the market share.⁴¹ When applied to the practices of TikTok Shop, several indicators are relevant to the market control criteria outlined in the law.⁴²

In addition to market dominance, there are also allegations of predatory pricing practices at TikTok Shop. Many imported products are sold at prices significantly below the domestic market price, which is believed to be a strategy to capture market share quickly. The Indonesian E-commerce Association (ideA) reported that around 30-40% of products on TikTok Shop are imported, many of which are sold at remarkably low prices, causing losses for local MSME enterprises.⁴³ This has the potential to violate Article 20 of Law Number 5 of 1999 on the Prohibition of Monopoly Practices and Unfair Business Competition, which prohibits enterprises from selling goods or services at predatory prices to eliminate competitors, only to later increase prices after the market has been overtaken. Although there is no KPPU decision stating that TikTok Shop engages in predatory pricing, this pattern of extremely low pricing raises indications that require further investigation.⁴⁴

Although minister of Trade Regulation No. 31/23 expressly prohibits the incorporation of social media and e-commerce functions into a single ecosystem, TikTok Shop continues to conduct trading activities, either directly or indirectly. Although the government announced the suspension of TikTok Shop in late 2023, media reports and merchant statements revealed that many transactions were still being conducted through live-streaming features

⁴¹ HabibiMiftakhur Rokhman, *Hukum Pasar Modal Indonesia ; Perkembangan Hukum Pasar Modal Era Kolonial Hingga Era Digital*, in *Inara Publisher*, vol. 5, no. Oktober (2022).

⁴² I GUSTI AGUNG WISUDAWAN et al., "Penerapan Sanksi Hukum Terhadap Pelanggaran Keterbukaan yang Dilakukan oleh Emiten di Pasar Modal Indonesia," *GANEK SWARA* 17, no. 2 (2023), <https://doi.org/10.35327/gara.v17i2.466>.

⁴³ Azizah Hayatul Zannah et al., "Realisasi Kegiatan Investasi Dalam Pasar Modal Terhadap Pelaksanaan Tanggungjawab Sosialatau Corporate Social Responsibility (Csr)," *Jurnal Ilmu Pengetahuan Sosial* 9, no. 8 (2022).

⁴⁴ Emeraldita Putri Anjani et al., "Tinjauan Yuridis Terhadap Influencer Yang Merekomendasikan Saham Tertentu Berdasarkan Hukum Pasar Modal Di Indonesia," *Reformasi Hukum* 26, no. 2 (2022), <https://doi.org/10.46257/jrh.v26i2.467>.

or via external links.⁴⁵ This suggests that TikTok Shop is still operating, albeit factually, by exploiting regulatory loopholes. In fact, some local enterprises have admitted that their turnover has dropped dramatically since the rise of social commerce, as they have been unable to compete on price, technology, or market reach.⁴⁶

Legal analysis of these conditions reveals that although Law Number 5 of 1999 on the Prohibition of Monopoly Practices and Unfair Business Competition provides a legal framework for prohibiting monopoly practices and abuse of dominant positions, it has also established a strong legal framework for their prohibition. However, its substance and regulatory instruments remain inadequate for addressing the realities of modern digital business. Law Number 5 of 1999 on the Prohibition of Monopoly Practices and Unfair Business Competition emerged in a conventional market context, where market power is primarily measured by quantitative control over market share for goods or services. Provisions such as Article 25, paragraph (2), which refer to the 50% market share threshold as an indicator of dominant position, serve as a vital tool for assessing market dominance. However, the characteristics of digital businesses show a much more complex dimension of power.⁴⁷

In the context of digital platforms such as TikTok Shop, market dominance is not always measured by transaction volume or conventional market share, but rather by mastery control of user data, control over content distribution algorithms, and control over platform capabilities that enable market access through a closed ecosystem. Digital platforms are unique in that they act as marketplaces, technology infrastructure providers, user data managers, and curators of products presented to consumers. This creates a significant information asymmetry between the platform and the enterprises who use it. Law Number 5 of 1999 on the Prohibition of Monopoly Practices and Unfair Business Competition has not explicitly regulated these aspects.⁴⁸ The term “*market control*” in legislation is more commonly interpreted as the ability to control prices or the supply of goods and services. Still, it does not include the power to control the visibility of products on the consumer screen through algorithms, which are the core power platforms, such as TikTok Shop. The TikTok algorithm can determine which products will appear, to whom they are displayed, and when they will be displayed. This algorithmic power acts as a platform gatekeeper, deciding who gets broad market exposure and who is left to languish in the invisible market.

From the perspective of business competition law, mastery of non-transparent algorithms may give rise to discriminatory treatment prohibited by Article 19, letter d, of Law Number 5 of 1999 on the Prohibition of Monopoly Practices and Unfair Business Competition, which prohibits discrimination against certain business operators. For example, TikTok may give sellers who pay for expensive advertising services (e.g., influencer ads, featured products) greater display preference or exposure. In contrast, small enterprises who cannot afford to pay will experience limited market access. This creates a non-tariff barrier to entry that, although it does not directly limit prices, significantly restricts MSMEs' ability to compete fairly.

Additionally, predatory pricing poses a significant risk in social commerce. TikTok Shop, through seller subsidy mechanism or extremely low promotional pricing, may cause local enterprises to be gradually eliminated from the market. Article 20 of Law Number 5 of 1999 on the Prohibition of Monopoly Practices and Unfair Business Competition prohibits pricing strategies that set extremely low prices to eliminate competitors and subsequently increase prices after the market has been captured. However, proving predatory pricing in the context of digital platforms is considerably more complex. This is because the analysis must consider not only the cost of goods but also whether cross-subsidization from other platform businesses segments (e.g., advertising services or data monetization) enables TikTok to sustain extremely low prices. Law Number 5 of 1999 on the Prohibition of Monopoly Practices and Unfair Business Competition does not provide specific analysis tools to evaluate cost structure and subsidy strategies in digital business models. Consequently, KPPU faces significant methodological challenges, as it must develop a new technology-based approach, for example, by analyzing platform algorithms, content recommendation patterns, and business relationships between platforms and merchants.⁴⁹ The assessment

⁴⁵ Noufal Ardiyansah et al., “Hukuman bagi Pelaku Penipuan Pasar di Era Ekonomi Digital Ditinjau dari Hukum Pidana,” *Jurnal DINAMIKA* 29, no. 2 (2022).

⁴⁶ Lindiawatie and Dhona Shahreza, “Tinjauan Rasionalitas Islam : Sebuah Pemikiran Untuk Mendorong Generasi Milenial Y Dan Z Berinvestasi Di Pasar Modal Syariah,” *Jurnal Ekonomi Syariah* 6, no. 1 (2023).

⁴⁷ Kurniasari and Rahman, “Perlindungan Hukum bagi Pelaku Usaha Umkm Terhadap Penyalahgunaan Posisi Dominan Platform Digital : Marketplace Melalui Penetapan Harga dan Penguasaan Pasar.”

⁴⁸ Hasanudin et al., “Pengaruh Pengetahuan Investasi, Motivasi Dan Pelatihan Pasar Modal Terhadap Keputusan Investasi Yang Dimediasi Oleh Minat Investasi,” *JIMEA / Jurnal Ilmiah MEA (Manajemen, Ekonomi, Dan Akuntansi)* Vol. 5 No., no. 3 (2021).

⁴⁹ Vania Evanita Puspitasari et al., “Pengaruh Literasi Keuangan Syariah, Persepsi Imbal Hasil, Dan Motivasi Terhadap Minat Investasi Di Pasar Modal Syariah,” *Journal of Islamic Economics and Finance Studies* 2, no. 2 (2021), <https://doi.org/10.47700/jiefes.v2i2.3292>.

of market dominance in digital platforms is no longer adequately measured solely by quantitative market share, but must also consider behavioral economics, data science, and algorithmic technology.

If not anticipated in advance, the dominance of digital platforms such as TikTok can have a systemic impact, not only on local enterprises but also on Indonesia's digital economic sovereignty. Global platforms that do not maintain strong legal entities in Indonesia can divert profits abroad, complicate tax collection, and marginalize MSMEs, which have been the backbone of the national economy. Therefore, there is an urgent need to revise Law Number 5 of 1999 on the Prohibition of Monopoly Practices and Unfair Business Competition, or, at the very least, to establish special derivative regulations (guidelines) governing digital platforms as enterprises, which characteristics that differ significantly from those of conventional markets.⁵⁰

Thus, a legal analysis of alleged monopoly practices in PMSE through TikTok reveals that indications of market dominance, data control, algorithmic control, and potential predatory pricing have begun to emerge in TikTok Shop business practices. Although there is no legal decision stating that TikTok Shop violates Law Number 5 of 1999 on the Prohibition of Monopoly Practices and Unfair Business Competition, the gap between legal norms and the reality of business practices has become a strong signal of the need for regulatory renewal and enforcement methods that better fit the dynamics of the digital economy. Technological innovations such as TikTok Shop do bring benefits to consumers. However, they also carry the risk of concentrating market power in a global entity that can harm local enterprises and create inequality in the national market structure.

These structural distortions have a disproportionate impact on micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs), which lack the capital, technological capacity, and data resources necessary to compete within algorithm-driven ecosystems. The resulting exclusion of MSMEs reflects not only market failure but also regulatory inadequacy, as existing competition law frameworks remain primarily oriented toward conventional monopolistic conduct. The inability of current legal instruments to effectively address algorithmic dominance and ecosystem closure underscores a systemic gap in competition law enforcement, necessitating a recalibration of regulatory approaches to platform-based markets.

From a contemporary competition law perspective, assessing monopoly practices in digital markets requires an analytical framework that goes beyond conventional indicators such as market share or price controls. The Data-Driven Market Power Theory explains that the competitive advantage of digital platforms increasingly derives from the accumulation of large-scale user data, the ability to process such data through advanced algorithms, and the reinforcement of network effects that strengthen platform dependency. In the context of TikTok Shop, the platform's ability to collect extensive behavioral data—including viewing patterns, interaction history, and consumer purchasing preferences—allows it to optimize product recommendations and shape consumer demand through algorithmic curation. This mechanism creates a structural advantage that may gradually concentrate market power within the platform, even in the absence of direct price manipulation. Consequently, market dominance in digital ecosystems should not be evaluated solely through quantitative market share thresholds under Law No. 5 of 1999, but also through qualitative indicators such as data concentration, algorithmic control, and platform dependency that influence competitive dynamics in digital markets.

To address these structural challenges, regulatory reform in Indonesia's competition law framework should incorporate more specific governance mechanisms for digital platforms. One possible approach is the adoption of the platform neutrality principle, which requires digital platforms to treat all business users fairly and prohibits discriminatory algorithmic practices that prioritize certain sellers or affiliated services. In addition, regulatory authorities such as the Business Competition Supervisory Commission (KPPU) should be equipped with technical oversight tools to assess algorithmic transparency, data utilization practices, and platform integration strategies. Establishing regulatory guidelines on algorithm accountability, data access fairness, and platform interoperability could help prevent exclusionary conduct and reduce structural barriers for smaller enterprises, particularly MSMEs. By integrating these regulatory mechanisms into the national competition law framework—either through amendments to Law No. 5 of 1999 or through specific implementing regulations—Indonesia can develop a more adaptive legal regime capable of addressing data-driven market power and ensuring fair competition within the rapidly evolving digital economy.

⁵⁰ S. Mahmudah N. Goufe, P. Prananingtyas, "Perlindungan Hukum Terhadap Investor Akibat Informasi Menyesatkan Di Dalam Prospektus Pada Transaksi Efek Di Pasar Modal," *Diponegoro Law Review* 5, no. 3 (2016).

4. Conclusion

The rapid development of Trade Through Electronic Systems (PMSE) in Indonesia reflects a significant transformation in digital market structures, particularly with the emergence of social commerce platforms such as TikTok Shop. Unlike conventional e-commerce platforms, TikTok integrates social media interaction, algorithmic content distribution, and commercial transactions within a single digital ecosystem. This integration enables the platform to influence consumer purchasing behavior through personalized recommendations, live-streaming sales, and algorithmic visibility mechanisms. While such innovations contribute to the expansion of the digital economy, they also raise important competition law concerns when the platform simultaneously controls market access, data flows, and promotional mechanisms that shape market outcomes.⁵¹

These dynamics can be better understood through the perspective of Data-Driven Market Power Theory, which emphasizes that dominance in digital markets increasingly stems from control over user data, algorithmic recommendation systems, and platform infrastructure rather than from traditional indicators such as market share alone. Within integrated ecosystems such as TikTok Shop, the platform may potentially engage in practices such as algorithmic self-preferencing, preferential promotion of certain sellers, or indirect exclusion of competitors through data-driven visibility control. Such conditions challenge the conventional framework of competition law, which is often designed for traditional markets and may not fully capture the structural power exercised by digital platforms operating in multi-sided markets.⁵²

Therefore, this study argues that Indonesia's regulatory framework must evolve to more explicitly address the risks of data-driven platform dominance within the PMSE ecosystem. Although Government Regulation No. 80 of 2019 and Minister of Trade Regulation No. 31 of 2023 represent important regulatory steps, further reforms are necessary to integrate competition law principles into digital platform governance. Future regulatory approaches should incorporate clearer standards related to platform neutrality, algorithmic transparency, and the use of consumer data as a source of market power, while also establishing mechanisms to identify self-preferencing practices and data-driven market foreclosure. Strengthening coordination between the Business Competition Supervisory Commission (KPPU) and other digital economy regulators will be essential to ensure that Indonesia's digital commerce ecosystem develops in a manner that promotes fair competition, protects MSMEs, and maintains sustainable digital market growth.

⁵¹ Walid Abdulla Ali et al., "Validating the Factors Influencing Social Commerce Adoption in Small and Medium Enterprise in Malaysia," *Indonesian Journal of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science* 17, no. 1 (2019), <https://doi.org/10.11591/ijeecs.v17.i1.pp440-447>.

⁵² Abu H. Ayob et al., "E-Commerce Adoption in ASEAN: Testing on Individual and Country-Level Drivers," *International Journal of Business Environment* 12, no. 1 (2021), <https://doi.org/10.1504/IJBE.2021.112108>.

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