

The Nexus of FTFs Counterterrorism Strategy, Immigration Control, and Border Security Through Indonesia's Migration Policy

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Abstract

This study employs a single case study to build an initial understanding of a case or an evaluation of a fatal attack by Uzbekistan detainees affiliated with a terrorist group to the immigration office at the North Jakarta Immigration Office. This work aims to design a counterterrorism strategy through migration policy and border control in Indonesia after the COVID-19 pandemic to build the resilience of nations to fight against radicalism and extremism. It finds that an immigration clearance process in border control management to prevent FTFs from entering Indonesia is limited to administrative clearance and a repository system of their documents and biometric data. Counterterrorism at immigration border controls in Indonesia focuses only on a downstream framework or at the stay-reside phase rather than an upstream prevention strategy. We recommend a revision of the Indonesian Immigration Law, which can include an FTFs counterterrorism strategy at immigration border controls. Immigration border control management should always prioritize pre-empting measures with risk management and focus on a pre-arrival interdiction or upstream prevention strategy.

1. INTRODUCTION

Border control and terrorism are broad and complex topics, evolving a variety of disciplines such as political science, security studies, and social sciences. Terrorism remains a significant global threat, and efforts are being made to prevent terrorist attacks. A study revealed that well-implemented border control measures and strict visa regulations can effectively prevent terrorists from entering the country.¹ In a discussion about the relationship between terrorism, international migration, and border control, the important role of border control in preventing terrorism and managing international migration into a country is initiating strategic international cooperation in intelligence and security, a sustainable and integrated approach, developing an inclusive approach and considering human rights in border control and international migration management.² the Australian government's approach to dealing with terrorism, for instance, is sometimes discriminatory towards minority groups, such as Muslims and migrants, because they tend to be strict, selective and lack a multicultural approach.³ Also, the U.S. border control policy in dealing with the threat of terrorism is too focused on physical border control, disregards social and economic factors, and undermines human rights.⁴ In addition, the impact of the terrorist attack in Paris on the issue of migration and terrorism in Europe, and several government policies which do not distinguish between migrants and terrorists, thus often causing stigma and discrimination against all groups of migrants regardless of background and migration destination.⁵

Indonesia has made significant efforts to enhance border control in addressing terrorist activities. The Directorate General of Immigration (DGI) plays a crucial role in migration management and border security, particularly in preventing the entry and movement of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs). This effort includes cooperation between the DGI and the National Counter-Terrorism Agency to exchange data and information, as well as initiatives to improve the capabilities of immigration officers through training and seminars. Several measures have been taken to strengthen border security and prevent terrorism from crossing borders. During the COVID-19 outbreak, terrorist attacks in Indonesia declined; however, counterterrorism operations and border control measures remained active to combat potential threats.

Despite these efforts, challenges remain in securing Indonesia's borders against terrorist infiltration. A notable incident occurred on April 10, 2023, when three Uzbekistan terrorists attempted to escape from detention at the North Jakarta Immigration Office, attacking officers with a kitchen knife. It resulted in the death of an immigration officer, Adi Widodo, and serious injuries to other officers. The escape attempt highlights the ongoing threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters and raises concerns regarding the effectiveness of detention security, migration policies, and border control mechanisms. The capture of two suspects, OM and RO, while another suspect drowned during the escape, underscores the urgency of enhancing border security protocols.⁶ This case demonstrates that foreign terrorist fighters in Indonesia operate covertly, reinforcing the need for further research into migration policy, border security measures, and counterterrorism strategies.

Current empirical works have discussed the Muslims in Indonesia, who are often inadvertently linked to issues of extremism and terrorism. In the early 2000s, Indonesia experienced infiltration by several FTFs from Malaysia connected to the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) group. One of these was Azahari Husin, a bomb expert involved in the Bali bombings.⁷ The efforts of the Indonesian government in fighting against Islamic extremism

- 1 Nazli Avdan, *Visas and Walls: Border Security in the Age of Terrorism* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019), <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv16t6jpi>.
- 2 Huseyin Cinoglu and Nurullah Altun, "Terrorism, International Migration, and Border Control," *European Scientific Journal* 9, no. 20 (2013): 100-114
- 3 James Jupp, "Terrorism, Immigration, and Multiculturalism: The Australian Experience," *International Journal* 61, no. 3 (2006): 699-710.
- 4 Todd Bensman, "What Terrorist Migration Over European Borders Can Teach About American Border Security," *Center for Immigration Studies* (2019):27
- 5 Sinha, Shreya. "Migration and Terrorism in Europe: A Nexus of Two Crises." *International Journal on Responsibility* 5, no. 1 (2023): 7.
- 6 Muhammad Aulia Rahman, "Bunuh Petugas Imigrasi Jakarta Utara, 3 Teroris Asal Uzbekistan Kabur," *Berita Satu*, April 11, 2023, <https://www.beritasatu.com/nasional/1037636/bunuh-petugas-imigrasi-jakarta-utara-3-teroris-asal-uzbekistan-kabur>
- 7 Kartini Aboo Talib et al., "Terrorist Threats: Measuring the Terms and Approaches," *Asian Social Science* 8, no. 15 (November 30, 2012), <https://doi.org/10.5539/ass.v8n15p288>.

have shown some progress, including the arrest and trial of terrorism offenders, and the implementation of programs to prevent radicalization and promote peace despite a shortage of human resources and equipment, and poor inter-agency and inter-state cooperation.⁸ There is an impact of terror attacks on the security of Indonesia and the regional region, including their impact on Indonesia's economy, politics and international relations.⁹ The threat of terrorism has been a persistent challenge for Indonesia, and the presence of FTFs has exacerbated the situation.¹⁰ These individuals have infiltrated the country, worsening domestic radicalization, increasing counterterrorism costs, affecting political stability, and shaping Indonesia's foreign policy.¹¹ In the maritime domain, extensive literature has explored the security challenges and threats faced by Indonesia in the maritime sector, such as illegal trade, illegal fishing, and maritime terrorism.¹² In Asia, various terrorist organizations collaborate by exchanging firearms and financial resources to support the training of new recruits across multiple borders. Additionally, terrorism in the region is often linked to drug trafficking, which serves as a significant source of funding for their operations.¹³

There are detrimental factors that encourage the threat of terrorism in the maritime Southeast Asia region, such as poverty, social injustice, and armed conflict including various terrorist organizations active in the region, such as Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu Sayyaf.¹⁴ Besides, efforts have been made by the governments of Indonesia and the Philippines to overcome the threat of terrorism in the Sulu-Sulawesi sea area, including cooperation between the two countries in terms of intelligence exchange and joint patrols.¹⁵ In this sense, some previous studies are limited to the discussions of terrorism in the context of radicalism, terrorism in Islam, and maritime borders. Our study fills the gaps in investigating terrorism by foreign terrorist fighters through border controls and migration policy in Indonesia.

Against this backdrop, it is argued that the concept of border security, migration control and counter-terrorism strategy lack coordination and cooperation among relevant border agencies involved in border surveillance, border checks, and border security against foreign terrorist fighters who cross Indonesia's borders. Secondly, there is a lack of data and information about transnational terrorist networks, and the Indonesian government is unable to identify and control foreigners who are involved in terrorist networks in Indonesia. Thirdly, the absence of understanding of the profiles and characteristics of foreigners involved in criminal acts of terrorism in Indonesia indicates no risk analysis in identifying terrorism risks by foreign nationals because of inadequate capacity and skills in developing terrorism risk assessment. At last, there is a lack of coordination among agencies such as the Indonesian Military (TNI), Indonesian National Police/INP (Polri), Indonesian Intelligence Agency (BIN), and National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT), a lack of coordination between countries in fighting terrorism in the region, a weakness in the border security system, and the threat of terrorism in neighboring countries, such as the Philippines and Malaysia.

This study focuses on the case of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) in Indonesia who enter Indonesia with an Indonesian visa and through immigration border control (TPI). It questions to what extent the immigration control and border security across Indonesia's border have been managed by the Directorate General of Immigration (DGI) to prevent the FTFs from entering Indonesia in the framework of counter-terrorism strategy?

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- 8 Tatan Kustana, "Islamic terrorism in Indonesia: Addressing Government Strategies and Muslim Population," *Jurnal Pertahanan* 3, no. 2 (2017): 77-100.
 - 9 Dirk Tomsa, "The Jakarta Terror Attack and its Implications for Indonesian and Regional Security," *Singapore: ISEAS* (2016)
 - 10 Dumitru-Mihai Luca, "The Global Economic Impact of Terrorism," *European Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies* 7, no. 2 (October 1, 2021): 19–29, <https://doi.org/10.26417/825nwp27o>.
 - 11 Muhammad Rizal Taufikurahman and Ahmad Heri Firdaus, "The Economic Consequences and Strategies of the US-China Trade War on Indonesia: A GTAP Simulation Analysis," in *Proceedings of the International Conference on Trade 2019 (ICOT 2019)* (Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2019), <https://doi.org/10.2991/icot-19.2019.22>.
 - 12 Iis Gindarsah and Adhi Priamarizki. Indonesia's maritime doctrine and security concerns. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies., 2022.
 - 13 Mamadou Bah and Zakaria Dit Zan Sangare, "Globalization of Terrorism: A Transnational Threat in Asia," *Journal of Social and Political Sciences* 1, no. 2 (July 10, 2018): 147–57, <https://doi.org/10.31014/aior.1991.01.02.10>.
 - 14 Tabrani, Dedy, Al Chaidar, and Herdi Sahrasad. *Globalism, Terrorism and Islamism in Southeast Asia*: Madani Press, 2020.
 - 15 Senia Febrica, "Securing the Sulu-Sulawesi seas from Maritime terrorism: a troublesome cooperation?," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 8, no. 3 (2014): 64-83.

In addition, the regulations, border control procedures, and migration policy in Indonesia were explored to identify the counter-terrorism strategy for foreign terrorist fighters who apply for Indonesian visas, proceed to an immigration clearance, and stay in Indonesia. This paper aims to look into how immigration operations, detention, and deportation orders are managed, especially the initiation of collaboration and cooperation among agencies. This work also aims to design a counterterrorism strategy through migration policy and border control in Indonesia after the COVID-19 pandemic to build the resilience of nations to fight against radicalism and extremism.

This study contributes significantly to the understanding and improvement of Indonesia's border security and counter-terrorism strategies by evaluating the effectiveness of immigration policies and procedures in preventing the entry of FTFs. It provides critical insights into the regulatory framework, border control processes, and migration policies, identifying gaps and offering recommendations to enhance national security. By examining the role of inter-agency collaboration, this research highlights the importance of integrated efforts between the DGI, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies. Additionally, it explores the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on immigration operations and proposes strategies for post-pandemic resilience to counter radicalism and extremism. The study also emphasizes innovative policy solutions, such as the use of technology and data-sharing platforms, to strengthen border monitoring and risk assessment. Furthermore, it situates Indonesia's counter-terrorism efforts within regional and global frameworks, providing valuable lessons for other nations. This research not only fills a gap in academic literature but also serves as a practical resource for policymakers and practitioners in the fields of migration management and national security.

2. METHOD

This study employs a single case study as a qualitative research method that focuses only on one specific case.¹⁶ This approach builds an initial understanding of a case or an evaluation¹⁷ in a fatal attack by Uzbekistan detainees affiliated with terrorism group to immigration office at North Jakarta Immigration Office. As primary data, this study interviewed the immigration officers at the North Jakarta Immigration Office, and available secondary data is collected to be examined: regulations about Indonesian immigration policy and border control, internet news or articles, DGI annual reports, and other relevant publications. This work is using the data process analysis, that examining the sequence or order of events in the case under study to understand the dynamics and interactions between the elements involved in the phenomenon. In this sense, the importance of reflection and criticism of the analysis is undertaken considering the suitability between the data found to make conclusions.

The secondary data in this study comprises national legal instruments related to immigration, serving as a critical foundation for understanding and evaluating Indonesia's immigration control mechanisms. These legal instruments, which include regulations governing immigration oversight and inspection, form the framework for assessing the effectiveness of current policies in preventing the entry of FTFs into Indonesia. Through detailed analysis and evaluation, this study analyses the construction of these regulations in monitoring and inspecting individuals seeking entry, particularly those posing potential security threats. By focusing on the following legal basis for immigration surveillance, the research seeks to identify strengths, gaps, and opportunities for improving the regulatory framework to enhance Indonesia's border security and counter-terrorism efforts, as follows:

1. Indonesian Immigration Law No.6 of 2011
2. Government Regulation No. 40 of 2023 on the Fourth Revision on the Implementation of Indonesian Immigration Law
3. Regulation of Law and Human Rights Minister No. 9 of 2024 on the Immigration Clearance Procedure of Entry and Exit of a Person at Indonesian Immigration Border Control
4. Regulation of Law and Human Rights Minister No. 50 of 2016 on Joint Team for Surveillance and Operation to Foreign Nationals

16 Robert K. Yin, "Case study research and applications: Design and Methods. SAGE Publications," (2018).

17 Lazar, Jonathan, Jinjuan Heidi Feng, and Harry Hochheiser, *Research methods in human-computer interaction*, Morgan Kaufmann. 2017

5. Regulation of Law and Human Rights Minister No. 4 of 2017 on Procedure of Immigration Surveillance and Operation
6. Regulation of Law and Human Rights Minister No. 11 of 2024 on Indonesian Visa and Residence Permits
7. Regulation of Law and Human Rights Minister No. 8 of 2022 on Immigration Intelligence
8. Regulation of Law and Human Rights Minister No. 33 of 2018 on Immigration Control and Surveillance System to Deter and/or Prevent the Terrorism, Human Trafficking, Drugs Trafficking, and Infectious Diseases at Points of Entry

The data analysis in this study involves a systematic examination of both primary and secondary data to understand the dynamics and interactions within the case of a fatal attack by Uzbekistan detainees affiliated with a terrorist group on the North Jakarta Immigration Office. The primary data includes interviews with immigration officers, providing first-hand insights into their experiences and perspectives. Secondary data, such as Indonesian immigration regulations, border control policies, news articles, DGI annual reports, and other relevant publications, is used to supplement and contextualize the findings. The analysis employs a process-oriented approach, focusing on the sequence of events to uncover the interactions and relationships between various elements of the phenomenon. This method emphasizes critical reflection and the alignment of data with theoretical frameworks to ensure accurate and meaningful conclusions. By rigorously examining the data, the study aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the case and its implications for immigration policy and counter-terrorism strategies.

3. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

3.1. Migration and Terrorism in Indonesia: FTFs Case

Indonesia's strategic location as a vast archipelagic nation presents unique challenges for immigration control and border security. As a frontline defense against transnational threats, the Directorate General of Immigration (DGI) Indonesia plays a pivotal role in safeguarding the country from illicit activities, including the entry of FTFs. Effective border security and immigration policies are integral to Indonesia's counter-terrorism strategy, ensuring that entry points such as international airports are fortified against exploitation by extremist groups.¹⁸ Meanwhile, acts of terrorism often result in governments implementing stricter migration policies and the link between migration and terrorism extends across national borders. It involves not only the movement of terrorists and violence across countries but also the way countries adjust their migration policies based on terrorism events in other nations.¹⁹

Based on the interview, it is exposed the sequence of event, the from the travel history prior to their arrival in Indonesia to their escape catastrophe to explore practices and challenges of migration and border control policy in relation to counterterrorism strategy. At the beginning, four Uzbekistan passengers entered Indonesia with Visa on Arrival through Soekarno-Hatta International airport Jakarta on March 2023. They stayed in Jakarta and provoked the community via their social media accounts. In the press release of North Jakarta Immigration Office, it was reported that the National Police of Anti-terror Special Detachment (Densus 88) arrested four foreign nationals from Uzbekistan on 24 March 2023 because they were affiliated with an international terrorist group network and as part of propaganda on social media. They are BA alias JF (32), OMM alias IM (28), BKA (40), and MR alias MIR (26). They were held at the Immigration Office to wait for the deportation process to return to their home country. On 10 April 2023 at around 04.00 (Jakarta Time), three of the four terrorists attacked the officers and escaped from the detention room at the North Jakarta Immigration Office. The three terrorist who attacked the officers had successfully fled were BA alias JF, OMM alias IM, and MR alias MIR. Meanwhile, one foreigner with the initials BKA did not escape and remained at

18 Saul, Ben. "United Nations Measures to Address the Root Causes and Conditions Conducive to Terrorism, and to Prevent Violent Extremism (Pve): 1972–2019." In *Research Handbook on International Law and Terrorism*: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2020.

19 Marc Helbling and Daniel Meierrieks, "Terrorism and migration: An overview," *British Journal of Political Science* 52, no. 2 (2022): 977-996.

the North Jakarta Immigration Office.

The three terrorists took the knife in the kitchen or pantry, and they attacked officers who were having breakfast and dawn prayers. Then, they attacked the officers at the location, then fled by breaking into the ceiling of the Immigration Office. They were suspected of fleeing to Sunter area, but one of them who fled, with the initials BA alias JF, was found dead in Sunter River, North Jakarta, Monday 10 April 2023 at 14.40 (Jakarta time). Meanwhile, the other two who fled were arrested in the North Jakarta area. At 10.50 (Jakarta time), OMM alias IM was arrested in the Shophouse Area Garden near the Bukit Gading Indah Complex. Then, the foreigner with the initials MR alias MIR was arrested at around 20.30 (Jakarta time) in the tunnel of Sunter River.

While the interview provides valuable insights into the sequence of events, it lacks a comprehensive analysis of systemic weaknesses that enabled the escape. For instance, the security protocols at the detention facility appear insufficient, given that detainees could access weapons (knives) and exploit structural vulnerabilities (ceiling escape). Furthermore, the narrative omits any reflection on preventive measures, such as stricter monitoring or enhanced collaboration between immigration and law enforcement, which could have mitigated the risks. The laws governing warfare can and should be adapted to address the unique challenges posed by an indefinite conflict with a transnational terrorist organization.²⁰ This can be done by comparing the detention of individuals to military targeting and applying principles from targeting rules to detention practices. Using a “targeting approach” to determine the standards for detaining individuals offers a way to balance the need for security with the protection of individual freedoms, helping to address gaps in existing detention laws. The interview also focuses predominantly on the events post-arrest, with limited exploration of their activities before entry or how they exploited migration policies to gain entry. Additionally, the absence of perspectives from other stakeholders, such as law enforcement or intelligence agencies, limits the depth of the analysis.

Detention and deportation protocols, as overseen by the DGI, are critical components of managing high-risk individuals while awaiting their return to their home countries. Additionally, robust escort protocols for FTFs are necessary to prevent incidents during detention or deportation processes.²¹ However, the success of these measures depends heavily on seamless cooperation among immigration authorities, law enforcement agencies, and intelligence networks.²² The growing cooperation between Anglosphere countries (like the US, UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) in areas such as border and immigration control, policing, and counter-terrorism reflects a strengthening or reassertion of state sovereignty. These collaborative efforts show how states are working together to protect their borders and security while maintaining control over their national policies and interests in an increasingly interconnected world.²³ Nevertheless, such collaboration in the context of Indonesia's border security is considered weak in addressing vulnerabilities, responding to threats, and ensuring that Indonesia's borders remain secure against the evolving tactics of terrorist networks. The case involving Uzbek nationals detained at the North Jakarta Immigration Office shows the lack of coordination and enhanced security protocols to mitigate risks in immigration and border management.

3.1. Migration, Border Control and FTFs in Indonesia

Migration can unintentionally create opportunities for terrorism to spread because migrants often form networks based on shared backgrounds, such as coming from the same country or belonging to the same ethnic group. These networks, built on trust and commonality, can sometimes be exploited by individuals with terrorist intentions to organize or spread their activities.²⁴ In addition, there is little proof that terrorism is consistently

20 Chadwick, Elizabeth. *Self-Determination, Terrorism and the International Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict*: BRILL, 2023.

21 Ridwan Arifin, “Assessing Border Control Management of Immigration Control at Airports in Indonesia: A Theoretical and Empirical Study,” PhD diss., Flinders University, College of Business, Government and Law., 2020.

22 Caune, Minta, Mary Claire Flynn, Hadley Herbst, Caroline Heyburn, Samuel Medina, and Brendan O'Connor. “How to Measure Effective Border Security: A Focus on Metrics and Recommendations for Addressing Illicit Arms and Technology Transfers.” (2024).

23 Tim Legrand and Christian Leuprecht, “Securing cross-border collaboration: transgovernmental enforcement networks, organized crime and illicit international political economy,” *Policy and Society* 40, no. 4 (2021): 565-586.

24 Orlando Cenciarelli, Sandro Mancinelli, Gian Marco Ludovici, and Leonardo Palombi, “Migration and terrorism: a new

brought into a country by people from nations with large Muslim populations or strong terrorist networks.²⁵ On the contrary, policies that marginalize or exclude foreigners already residing in a country are more likely to increase the risk of violence among these populations. Similarly, targeting or attacking foreigners in their host country can escalate the likelihood of violent responses rather than reducing the threat of terrorism. However, there is not much proof that making migration policies stricter effectively reduces terrorism.²⁶ Stricter migration rules might slow down economic progress by limiting the flow of migrant workers, while also worsening security by increasing the risk of terrorism instead of reducing it. Instead of viewing terrorism as a broader issue, it is increasingly framed as a matter of counter-terrorism policing.²⁷ This perspective leads to a growing tendency to treat border security and counter-terrorism as the same issue, blurring the lines between managing migration and addressing threats of terrorism. This conflation can create challenges in effectively handling both problems separately and appropriately.

The Table 1 provides a detailed account of foreign individuals involved in terrorism-related activities in Indonesia, focusing on their nationality, immigration status, legal status, and the year of the incidents. It includes cases from 2003 to 2023, listing individuals primarily from Malaysia, China (Uyghur), and Uzbekistan. The immigration statuses range from free-visa facilities to counterfeit visas and visa-on-arrival, highlighting how these individuals gained entry into Indonesia. Legal outcomes vary, including arrests, convictions, and penalties for immigration law violations and terrorism crimes, as well as deaths resulting from law enforcement operations such as Densus 88 and Tinombala. Notably, the table underscores the use of fraudulent documentation by some individuals and highlights the collaboration between immigration and counter-terrorism efforts in addressing such cases.

As shown in Table 1, it is disclosed series of terrorism attack by the FTFs of foreign nationals in Indonesia after 9/11 tragedy. These FTFs were dead, arrested, and convicted by the Indonesian authorities because they were proven guilty in the violations of the anti-terrorism law and immigration law.

Table 1. FTFs by Foreign Nationals in Indonesia with Violations of Anti-Terrorism Law and Immigration Law

No.	Full Name	Nationality	Immigration Status	Legal Status	Year
1.	Nasir Abbas	Malaysian	Free-Visa facility	Arrested in Bekasi and Convicted 10 years of imprisonment for immigration law violations.	2003
2.	Dr. Azahari bin Husain, Ph.D.	Malaysian	Free-Visa facility	Dead by the Densus 88 raid in Malang	2005
3.	Noordin M. Top	Malaysian	Free-Visa facility	Dead by the Densus 88 raid in Solo	2009

approach to consider the threat,” *Cyber and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosives Challenges: Threats and Counter Efforts* (2017): 277-287.

- 25 Axel Dreher, Martin Gassebner, and Paul Schaudt, “The effect of migration on terror: Made at home or imported from abroad?,” *Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d’économie* 53, no. 4 (2020): 1703-1744.
- 26 Marc Helbling and Daniel Meierrieks, “Terrorism and migration: An overview,” *British Journal of Political Science* 52, no. 2 (2022): 977-996.
- 27 McLeman, Robert. “International Migration and Climate Adaptation in an Era of Hardening Borders.” *Nature Climate Change* 9, no. 12 (2019): 911-18.

4.	Ahmet Bozoglan alias Ahmet alias Hamzah	Chinese Uyghur	Counterfeit Visitor Visa (visa granted by the Indonesian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur).	Arrested in Poso and Convicted 8 years of imprisonment, Rp100.000.000 penalty, and 6 months of detention for terrorism crime and immigration law violations.	2015
5.	1. Ahmet Mahmud alias Ahmet Bozoglan 2. Abdullah Alias Altinci Bayyram Alias Bayram alias Muhammad Kasiem bin Mustafa 3. Abdulbasit Tuzer	Chinese Uyghur	Counterfeit Visitor Visa (visa granted by the Indonesian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur) with fraudulent passport.	Arrested in Poso and Convicted 6 years of imprisonment, Rp100.000.000 penalty, and 6 months of detention for terrorism crime and immigration law violations.	2015
6.	1. Sadik Yorulmas alias Abdul Azis alias Abdul 2. Ismail Turan alias Abu Basir alias Joko 3. Nurettun Gundogdu alias Abdul Malik 4. Batuhsan Magalasi alias Faruq	Chinese Uyghur	Unknown	Dead by the Tinombala Operation in Poso	2016
7.	1. BA alias JF (dead) 2. OMM alias IM 3. MR alias MIR 4. BKA	Uzbekistan	Visa on Arrival	Dead and Arrested Suspects under Investigation for a trial in the court of law facing criminal charges.	2023

Source: Authors, 2023 adopted from Cut Maulina, 2019; IPAC, 2018; Juwana, 2013; Singh & Battle-hardened, 2016 and Judge's Convictions 2015 at Central Jakarta High Court

All terrorism attacks in Table 1 demonstrate that those FTFs are non-Indonesian citizens who spread radicalism to Indonesian people and conducted series of terrorist attacks in Indonesia. They managed to enter the Indonesia's territory by air, with commercial flights, and some entered Indonesia through land routes and cross-border posts, using fake passports, fake visit visas, original passports, visa-free facilities, and visas on arrival. They successfully went through an immigration clearance at the ports of entry and were not detected by immigration officers who undertook immigration operations. In addition, in the case of terrorism by four Uzbek nationals in 2023, they managed to escape the detention room and attacked officers while waiting for deportation orders to their home country.

While the Table 1 provides valuable insights into the intersection of immigration and terrorism in Indonesia, it could benefit from greater clarity and organization. For instance, the inclusion of grouped aliases under single rows may create confusion; separating them into distinct entries would improve readability. The lack of detailed immigration statuses for some cases, such as "Unknown" for several individuals, diminishes the comprehensiveness of the data. Additionally, the table does not explicitly indicate the role of inter-


agency cooperation in managing these cases, which is critical in understanding the broader counter-terrorism framework. Yet, there is no analysis of patterns or systemic weaknesses exploited by these individuals, such as vulnerabilities in visa issuance or border control, which would provide a stronger foundation for addressing these challenges. Including these elements could make the table more actionable for policymakers and researchers.

3.2. Migration Policy, Border Security, and FTFs in Indonesia

Transnational terrorism can push governments to adopt stricter migration policies.²⁸ This is because such policies may increase the difficulty and cost for terrorists to operate, potentially deterring future attacks. The process of treating immigration as a security issue (securitization) supports the idea that terrorism crossing borders motivates governments to make migration policies more restrictive. Borders can serve as critical points to detect and stop terrorist threats.²⁹ When terrorists cross borders, they can be identified if their movements and activities are effectively tracked and monitored. Achieving this requires strong cooperation and coordination between neighboring countries, international organizations, and regional agencies to share information and work together in countering terrorism

Referring to such tragedy, Figure 1 illustrates the entry, stay, and exit process of non-Indonesian citizens to Indonesia based on the Indonesian immigration regulations. First, a foreign national can apply for an Indonesian visa (if required) through an online application system to wait for a visa approval and visa grant from the DGI. Secondly, when they arrive at ports of entry, they must proceed to an immigration clearance with their visa, or apply for a visa on arrival, or with visa-free facility. During their stay in Indonesia, they can extend their visa by applying for a residence permit at an immigration office or they can apply for a status conversion to another residence permits. When their expiry date of residence permits ends soon, they must leave Indonesia to avoid overstaying their visa. For all these phases, the DGI and immigration offices undertake immigration surveillances, operations, and raids.

Figure 1. Entry, Stay, and Exit Process of a Non-Indonesian Citizen to Indonesia



Source: Authors, 2023 adopted from the Indonesian Regulations

28 Marc Helbling and Daniel Meierrieks, "Transnational terrorism and restrictive immigration policies," *Journal of Peace Research* 57, no. 4 (2020): 564-580.


29 Sajjan M. Gohel, *Prevention of cross-border movements of terrorists: Operational, political, institutional and strategic challenges for national and regional border controls*, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), 2020.

Under current conditions, the movement of people to Indonesia in Figure 2, especially non-Indonesian citizens, must apply for an Indonesian visa, including an electronic visa on arrival online through the <https://visa-online.imigration.go.id/> application system by lodging all required documents. Upon arrival at the ports of entry, immigration clearance is conducted by taking biometric data, validating passports, verifying visas, checking their names in the movement alert lists (block lists), Stolen and Lost Travel Document lists (SLTD) connected to the Interpol I-24/7 system, and other immigration clearance. While staying in Indonesia, they can apply for an extension of residence permit in person at an immigration office by taking biometric data. When leaving the territory of Indonesia, departure immigration clearance process includes validating passports, verifying validity period of stay permits, and checking their names in the movement alert lists. All inspection processes and issuance of visas or residence permits have been recorded in the immigration management information system (SIMKIM).

The process of entering and leaving Indonesia is depicted as a structured and technology-driven system, integrating online visa applications, border control measures, and immigration office protocols to ensure secure and efficient immigration management as seen in Figure 2. Travelers intending to enter Indonesia begin by applying for a visa online, with options such as regular visas or the Electronic Visa on Arrival (eVOA). Payment for these visas can be made through international payment systems like JCB, Visa, Mastercard, or Indonesian banks. Once their visa is granted, travelers depart from their home or transit country through an international departure terminal. Upon arrival in Indonesia, travelers proceed to Points of Entry managed by Indonesia's Border Control (TPI). Here, they undergo a series of checks, including biometric recording, passport and visa validation, Cekal checks (screening for individuals barred from entry), and real-time verification with Interpol 24/7 to identify potential security threats. Travelers holding free visas or visas on arrival also undergo these clearance procedures. If all checks are cleared, entry into the country is approved, and travelers are permitted to proceed.

During their stay in Indonesia, travelers who wish to extend their visit can apply for a Residence Permit (RP) either online or at the local immigration office. The immigration office then conducts a thorough verification of the application before granting or renewing the residence permit, ensuring that travelers comply with local immigration regulations. The exit process begins at the Points of Exit under Indonesia's Border Control (TPI). Travelers undergo final checks to validate their visa or residence permit, passport, and compliance with immigration laws through Cekal checks. Data from these checks is verified against the local immigration server to confirm the traveler's status, ensuring that all records are accurate and up-to-date. Once these checks are successfully completed, travelers are cleared to leave the country. This system underlines Indonesia's reliance on advanced digital tools and collaboration with international and local agencies. By integrating biometric recording, local servers, and global databases like Interpol, Indonesia's immigration process ensures a secure, streamlined approach to managing border control and migration.

Figure 2. Immigration Border Control Management in Indonesia



Source: Authors, 2023 adopted from the Indonesian Immigration Regulation

While Indonesia's immigration process is technologically advanced and integrates critical tools such as biometric recording, Interpol databases, and local server verification, the system still demonstrates vulnerabilities, particularly in preventing the entry of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs). Despite robust pre-arrival and entry procedures, such as eVOA applications and real-time Cekal checks, cases of FTFs entering the country indicate gaps in risk assessment and intelligence sharing. For example, the reliance on visa applications and documentation submitted online may not effectively detect fraudulent activities or individuals with concealed terrorist affiliations, especially if their profiles are not flagged in global databases like Interpol. Additionally, the border control process may face operational challenges, such as incomplete data integration or human error during manual checks, which can allow high-risk individuals to bypass scrutiny. Furthermore, the system appears to lack real-time collaboration with international intelligence agencies beyond Interpol, limiting its capacity to identify FTFs who may be using forged or stolen travel documents.

In the context of counterterrorism strategy, despite the immigration inspection stage with the SIMKIM information system, immigration border control management in Indonesia shows poor border security because it lacks terrorism risk analysis as a framework for immigration intelligence. Terrorism risk analysis in the context of immigration has nine indicators: the nature of the hostile act, motivation, purpose, plan to commit violence, the role of informants, network, relationship with extreme violence groups, media coverage, and relevance to the internet. It implies that an immigration clearance process in border control management to prevent FTFs from entering Indonesia are limited to administrative clearance and repository system of their documents and biometric data. In relation to the case of terrorist attack in the detention room of North Jakarta Immigration Office, the concepts of immigration surveillance, operation, and raid indicate weak procedure and approach which do not focus on counterterrorism including incapability of procedure of detention, detainee escort, and deportation orders.

The existing immigration procedures in Indonesia contain critical loopholes that significantly heighten vulnerability to infiltration by Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs). A primary weakness is the absence of an integrated and comprehensive database specifically dedicated to identifying, tracking, and managing FTF movements. Additionally, the immigration process heavily depends on manual paperwork, which results in inefficiencies, operational delays, and increased susceptibility to human error, further complicating timely decision-making. Another critical issue is the lack of systematic risk-based analysis, which impairs the ability of immigration authorities to accurately and promptly categorize travelers based on potential threat levels, thus weakening strategic resource allocation and security preparedness. Lastly, the reliance solely on human verification procedures without technological support, such as automated systems or data-driven analytics, limits the consistency, accuracy, and effectiveness of immigration screening. Collectively, these loopholes expose the immigration system to considerable risks, enabling potential exploitation by terrorist elements attempting to enter or exit the country undetected.

3.3. Indonesian Immigration Selective Policy and Immigration Law

Migration policies reflect how countries perceive and manage the movement of people across their borders.³⁰ When terrorism occurs in other countries, especially nearby ones, governments are more likely to tighten migration policies. This is because terrorism abroad raises awareness of security risks and increases public concern about safety, prompting governments to act. Such events also influence how policymakers approach the issue and generate political momentum to make changes. As a result, terrorism in neighboring countries can directly impact the likelihood of stricter migration laws being introduced in a country. However, there is no solid proof that countries facing frequent terrorist attacks are more likely to adopt stricter immigration policies.³¹ This challenges the common belief that an increased risk of terrorism pushes populist politicians to enforce tougher rules on immigration. Instead, the connection between terrorism and stricter immigration

30 Vincenzo Bove, Tobias Böhmelt, and Enzo Nussio, "Terrorism abroad and migration policies at home," *Journal of European Public Policy* 28, no. 2 (2021): 190-207.

31 Choi Seung-Whan, "Immigration policy and terrorism: an empirical analysis," *Defence and Peace Economics* 32, no. 3 (2021): 271-295.

policies may not be as straightforward as widely assumed. In addition, information about terrorism generally does not influence people's opinions or preferences regarding migration policies.³² Neither terrorism occurring in other countries nor information showing that the likelihood of being affected by terrorism is very low seems to change how people think migration policies should be shaped.

Indonesian immigration selective policy fails to address the transnational terrorism in Indonesia to prevent FTFs from crossing the Indonesia's borders. In the tragedy of four Uzbekistan FTFs in Indonesia, counterterrorism mobility strategy or CTMS has not been included in the immigration selective policy and border control management which are unable to identify and detect the movement of terrorist to Indonesia across the borders.³³ Integrated information system among relevant stakeholders is not showing an interest or political will by public managers at national organization such as DGI, BNPT, INP, and BIN for an intelligence data exchange. Counterterrorism mobility strategy refers to efforts to reduce the threat of terrorism by monitoring and controlling the movement of people, goods and vehicles across the borders. This strategy includes the adoption of technology, such as data monitoring and processing systems, and border security policies and strategies aimed at identifying and preventing terrorism before they occur. One of the important aspects of the counterterrorism mobility strategy is cooperation between many institutions and relevant parties: the government, law enforcement, and the transportation industry. By working together, they can build a more effective and integrated system to identify, monitor, and regulate the movement of suspicious people and goods.

Immigration regulations in terms of immigration border control against terrorism aim to prevent the entry of a person potentially involved in terrorist activities into a country. Border control management consists of strict surveillance and clearance procedures for every person, including background checks, the use of biometric identification technology, and wanted person list. Immigration regulations in Indonesia have an important role in responding to criminal acts of terrorism in terms of border security and immigration control to identify and prevent the entry of terrorists into Indonesia. However, immigration regulations in Indonesia are unable to respond the terrorism because the prevention approach in the regulations runs singularly and works separately among anti-terrorism agency, lacks provisions about collaboration and cooperation.³⁴ For instance, the relationship between immigration policy and efforts prevent terrorism in the European Union and efforts to prevent terrorism, such as enhancing border controls and strict immigration policies, which will affect the migration and mobility of people within the European Union.³⁵

Figure 3 represents Indonesia's Immigration Selective Policy, which is rooted in Indonesian Immigration Law No. 6 of 2011 and its subsequent revisions, including Government Regulation No. 40 of 2023. This policy framework outlines a comprehensive approach to immigration management, divided into four distinct phases, each supported by specific regulations designed to address different aspects of immigration control and border security. The Pre-Arrival Phase focuses on visa applications and approvals prior to an individual's entry into Indonesia. This phase is governed by the (Revised) Regulation of Law and Human Rights Minister No. 11 of 2024, which establishes guidelines for Indonesian visas and residence permits, ensuring that pre-entry procedures align with national security and immigration objectives.

The Arrival-Departure Phase addresses immigration clearance and entry approval processes at border checkpoints. This phase is regulated by the Regulation of Law and Human Rights Minister No. 9 of 2024, which provides detailed procedures for the entry and exit of individuals at Indonesian immigration border controls. It underscores the importance of thorough inspections to prevent unauthorized or high-risk individuals from entering the country. The Stay and Reside Phase I pertains to the application and issuance of residence permits for foreign nationals within Indonesia. This phase is also governed by the (Revised) Regulation of

32 Marc Helbling, Daniel Meierrieks, and Sergi Pardos-Prado, "Terrorism and immigration policy preferences," *Defence and Peace Economics* 34, no. 5 (2023): 646-659.

33 Andi Raihanah Ashar and Curie Maharani, "Far from Home: Profile of pro-IS Deportees' Mobility throughout 2016-2020 and Prevention Strategy of Indonesian Government," *JAS (Journal of ASEAN Studies)* 10, no. 1 (2022).


34 Harison Citrawan and Sabrina Nadilla, "Model kontrol keimigrasian dalam mencegah tindak pidana terorisme di Indonesia," *Lentera Hukum* 6 (2019): 71.

35 Haner, Murat, Melissa M Sloan, Francis T Cullen, Amanda Graham, Cheryl Lero Jonson, Teresa C Kulig, and Ömer Aydın. "Making America Safe Again: Public Support for Policies to Reduce Terrorism." *Deviant Behavior* 42, no. 10 (2021): 1209-27.

Law and Human Rights Minister No. 11 of 2024, ensuring that the legal status of foreign nationals is managed efficiently and securely during their stay.

The Stay and Reside Phase II focuses on the operation and surveillance of foreign nationals during their stay in Indonesia. This phase is supported by multiple regulations, including Regulation No. 50 of 2016, which mandates joint team surveillance operations; Regulation No. 4 of 2017, which outlines procedures for immigration surveillance and operations; and Regulation No. 8 of 2022, which emphasizes the role of immigration intelligence in monitoring foreign nationals. In addition to these phases, the figure highlights the overarching Regulation of Law and Human Rights Minister No. 33 of 2018, which establishes immigration control and surveillance systems to prevent terrorism, human trafficking, drug trafficking, and the spread of infectious diseases at points of entry. Together, these phases and regulations reflect a structured and integrated approach to immigration management, addressing national security concerns while facilitating lawful entry and residence in Indonesia.

Figure 3. Legal Instruments of Counterterrorism Strategy through Indonesian Immigration Policy



Source: Authors, 2023, adopted from Immigration Regulations

The ASEAN Convention on Counterterrorism (ACCT) 2007 aims to increase cooperation between member countries in efforts to prevent and overcome the threat of terrorism in the ASEAN region. The contents of the ACCT include definitions of terrorism, prevention of terrorism, handling of terrorism, human rights and cooperation. ACCT is a joint commitment of ASEAN member countries in dealing with the threat of terrorism and encouraging more effective cooperation in efforts to prevent and deal with terrorism in the ASEAN region. However, there are legal issues related to the convention, including human rights, regional security, and international cooperation in combating terrorism. Also, several weaknesses in the ACCT consist of an over-definition of terrorism, a lack of protection of human rights, and poor collaboration among ASEAN countries.³⁶ Indonesia as a member country of ASEAN has signed and ratified the ASEAN Convention on Counterterrorism (ACCT) in 2007. As a country that has experienced a series of sizable terrorist attacks, ACCT is important in providing a legal basis and framework for cooperation between ASEAN countries in deal with the threat of terrorism in the region. However, in practice, the implementation of ACCT in Indonesia

36 Febrica, Senia. "Asean Counterterrorism Cooperation and Human Rights Protection." *International Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism* (2019): 147-75.

remains a few challenges. Even though several regulations related to the prevention and handling of terrorism have been issued, including National Law Number 15 of 2003 about Criminal Acts of Terrorism and National Law Number 5 of 2018 about Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism, concrete steps should be put in place to implement ACCT effectively. However, organizations like the UN should prioritize human rights when creating new counterterrorism laws, rather than focusing solely on security concerns.³⁷ This approach is essential to ensure that global counterterrorism efforts remain consistent with human rights commitments and do not undermine individual freedoms or protections in the name of security.

In the ACCT, under Section VI 1.d. it is a compulsory to prevent the movement of terrorist to enter jurisdictions of the Southeast Asian countries by employing effective border control management and issuance of travel documents, especially counterfeit or fraudulent travel documents or visa. In response to the ACCT, the Indonesian government employs an immigration selective policy under the Indonesian Immigration Law Number 6 of 2011, along with other immigration regulations in terms of counterterrorism strategy through border control management. Figure 3 explains the legal instruments of border control management with four phases of people movement to Indonesia under the immigration selective policy. Such four phases are divided into pre-arrival phase for visa application and visa grant, arrival-departure phase for immigration clearance process and entry arrival, stay-reside phase I for residence permit application and issuance, stay-reside II phase for operation and surveillance.

International law, through treaties, does not encourage combining migration issues (such as refugee protection and forced migration) with national security concerns.³⁸ However, these treaties do give countries some limited rights to restrict the movement of individuals or deny international protection if there are valid concerns related to national security or terrorism. United Nations measures designed to combat terrorism seldom refer to migration or the protection of refugees and other individuals seeking international protection. This reflects a separation between migration-related issues and counter-terrorism efforts in international legal frameworks. Certain terrorist acts and other crimes committed by terrorist groups can be prosecuted under the category of transnational crimes.³⁹ The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) provides a framework to address profit-driven transnational organized crimes carried out by terrorist groups. However, these frameworks are often applied in a fragmented and inconsistent manner, addressing issues on a case-by-case basis rather than through a comprehensive and well-adapted approach.

Indonesia has enacted key national regulations to align with international counterterrorism conventions, particularly border security. Law No. 5 of 2018 expands the definition of terrorism, empowers Densus 88 and BNPT for preventive actions, and allows the revocation of citizenship for individuals joining terrorist groups abroad. Law No. 6 of 2011 on Immigration strengthens border surveillance through biometric screening and grants immigration officers the authority to deny entry and deport suspected terrorists. Additionally, Presidential Regulation No. 7 of 2021 (Stranas PK) integrates counterterrorism efforts among BNPT, Densus 88, DGI, and TNI, focusing on border security, surveillance, and international cooperation. These regulations reinforce Indonesia's commitment to global counterterrorism strategies while addressing transnational threats.

As seen in Figure 3, in the pre-arrival phase, a foreign national who plans to enter Indonesia can apply for an Indonesian visa, or visa on arrival, or free-visa facility. In the context of Indonesian visa grant, Article 42 of Indonesian Immigration Law No. 6 of 2011 describes that visa application is rejected if the applicant is involved in an organized transnational crime or threatening the national security of Indonesia. In the arrival phase, Article 17, section (1) of Indonesian Immigration Law No. 6 of 2011, states that the Immigration officers can deny entry foreigners involved in international crimes and transnational organized crime. To support the counterterrorism strategy in immigration border control management, in Article 13, letter g of Indonesian Immigration Law No. 6 of 2011 explains international crime and organized transnational crime comprise

37 Christopher Baker-Beall, "The concept of the foreign terrorist fighter: An immanent critique," *European Journal of International Security* 8, no. 1 (2023): 25-46.

38 Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild, "International law and European migration policy: where is the terrorism risk?," *Laws* 8, no. 4 (2019): 30.

39 Ben Saul, "The legal relationship between terrorism and transnational crime," *International Criminal Law Review* 17, no. 3 (2017): 417-452.

terrorism, people smuggling, human trafficking, money laundering, narcotics, and psychotropic substances. However, the Regulation of Law and Human Rights Minister No. 33 of 2018 about Immigration Control and Surveillance System to Deter and/or Prevent the Terrorism, Human Trafficking, Drugs Trafficking, and Infectious Diseases at Points of Entry has not been implemented by the DGI until this paper is written. It suggests that migration policy and border control management in Indonesia disclose weaknesses that can be exploited by terrorist groups to commit acts of terrorism in Indonesia.

The Immigration law is an effective tool for the Indonesian government to stop cross-border terrorist movements and limit the access of foreign terrorists to Indonesia. In this law, immigration officers have an authority to check and examine the identity and travel history of a person entering or leaving Indonesia, so it can help identify and control terrorist movements across the Indonesia's borders. However, practices of the Immigration law in dealing with terrorism is not yet composed with good cooperation and coordination between government agencies involved in handling terrorism, including border authorities like the Indonesian Customs, INP, BNPT, and BIN. In this case of Uzbekistan terrorists in Indonesia, it is believed that the front-line officers were unable to identify the movement of FTFs who cross the borders due to the absence of risk analysis and collaboration in data exchange. As a transnational terrorism, it infers that the immigration law and prevention of FTFs in Indonesia are not well-managed in terms of border security and cooperation. Migration laws can sometimes be overly strict or broad, which might unintentionally discourage beneficial immigration, such as skilled workers or refugees.⁴⁰ Because of this, terrorism is generally treated as a secondary factor in shaping migration policies, as other priorities like economic or humanitarian considerations tend to take precedence.

In addressing immigration border control management, adopting a proactive rather than reactive risk management strategy is crucial. Specifically, the discussion highlights the necessity of prioritizing pre-emptive measures, such as pre-arrival interdiction or upstream prevention. Implementing such measures involves actively assessing risk before individuals reach national borders, enabling immigration authorities to mitigate threats more effectively, reduce resource burdens at entry points, and enhance national security. By leveraging early intelligence-sharing, advanced passenger screening, and international collaboration, border control agencies can intercept potential security threats before arrival, significantly reducing downstream risks and operational strain.

Further, regarding the downstream prevention strategies, particularly in the stay-reside phase, it is considerable to revise the approach to detention and deportation orders by incorporating a clearly defined categorization framework. Detainees should be systematically classified based on risk levels—from low to high-risk categories—grounded in comprehensive security assessments and behavioural profiling. Establishing a clear hierarchy of detainee risk enables authorities to allocate resources more efficiently, manage detainees appropriately, and avoid unnecessary detention of individuals posing minimal threat. Moreover, implementing standardized categories enhances transparency, ensures human rights compliance, and promotes procedural fairness.

Additionally, the discussion underscores the critical necessity of maintaining minimum safety and security standards for immigration officers responsible for escorting, transferring, and supervising detainees. Such standards should include clearly articulated procedures, sufficient staffing, adequate conflict resolution training, and enhanced security protocols, ensuring both the safety of personnel and the humane treatment of detainees. By fortifying these processes, authorities uphold safety standards and contribute to broader institutional resilience and credibility.

4. CONCLUSION

Counterterrorism strategy by the Indonesian immigration agency at the borders are practiced under a selective immigration policy through four phases of border control management. Counterterrorism at immigration border controls in Indonesia focuses only on a downstream framework or at stay-reside phase rather than an upstream prevention strategy or pre-arrival interdiction and arrival detection. Referring to the tragedy

40 Nora V. Demleitner, "Immigration and Terrorism, in *Routledge Handbook on Immigration and Crime* (Holly Ventura Miller & Anthony Peguero eds., 2018)." (2018).

of terrorist attack by Uzbekistan FTFs, one of the weaknesses of Indonesian selective immigration policy in preventing terrorism is the lack of coordination and synergy between relevant institutions in implementing the policy. It is not likely to be implemented effectively, because they are constrained by information system weaknesses and a lack of adequate human resources. A revision of Indonesian Immigration Law which can include counterterrorism strategy at immigration border controls. Immigration border control management should always prioritize pre-empting measures with risk management and focus on a pre-arrival interdiction or upstream prevention strategy. In terms of downstream prevention strategy or stay-reside phase, detention and deportation orders should be revised with a category of low to high-risk detainee and with minimum standard of safety and security for officers in escorting, transferring or fortifying the detainees. Further work may complete this research which should elaborate more a discussion about upstream and downstream counterterrorism strategy at immigration border controls, including the evaluation detention and deportation orders in details, supporting the counter-terrorism strategy through migration policy.

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6. CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The author declares that there are no relationships or competing interests that could be perceived as a potential conflict of interest in relation to this research. There are no competing financial or non-financial interests to disclose.

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